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(IDK), and intelligence time to detect 50% of enemy forces (INTEL). The systems 
engineering approach utilizes Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) techniques to 
produce nine agent-based simulation meta-models. The study performs a value-focused, 
multi-objective decision analysis of the three alternative configurations by developing 
MOE-specific value functions and scenario-specific swing-weight matrices. The results 
are compiled into an Operational Resiliency Decision Block that provides decision 
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The United States Army’s Operating Concept mandates that the Army prepare to 
face an unknown enemy, in an unknown environment, with an unknown mission, and 
unknown partners (TRADOC 2014). With that in mind, operational commanders are 
charged with putting the right people against the right problems, even when the problems 
are complex and uncertain. This research develops and demonstrates a method for 
assessing a unit’s performance across multiple potential scenarios through simulation. 
The analysis of the operational resiliency of an Army company team provides operational 
decision makers key insights into the effects of setting a resource requirement, namely a 
limited amount of men, weapons, and equipment—both organic and nonorganic. 
In this project, operational resiliency is defined as “the ability of the system to 
absorb strain and preserve functioning despite the presence of adversity” (Sutcliffe and 
Vogus 2003, 96). Through adaptation, operational resiliency measures the ability of a 
company team to preserve its warfighting capability when operating in different 
operational scenarios comprised of distinct mission, enemy, and terrain requirements. 
Ultimately, the intended purpose of this project is to demonstrate a practical example of 
how to assess a company team’s operational resiliency, with the intent to provide an 
operational decision maker and his/her staff with a valuable and useful analytical tool. 
This study evaluates three alternative configurations (Configurations A, B, and C) 
of a combined-arms Army company team. Each combined-arms Army company team is 
composed of seven components: three ground maneuver assets, two air assets, one 
indirect fire support, and one headquarters command post. The three ground assets are the 
M1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and dismounted infantry 
squads. The two air assets are the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter and the RQ-7 Shadow 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The indirect fire support is the M777 155-millimeter 
howitzer artillery. Lastly, the headquarters element exists to provide command and 
control, and is simulated as the crucial communications link for generic situational 
awareness between the elements. The three configurations are leveraged from a recent 
capstone project (Basala et al. 2013) and selected specifically as being the three highest 
 xviii 
ranking alternatives developed in their study. Table 1 displays the three highest ranking 
alternatives as a result of their analysis. 
Table 1.   Army Company Team Unit Configurations 
 
 
Each configuration is evaluated for their simulated performance in three distinct 
scenarios (Scenario 1—Mountain Attack, Scenario 2—Urban Clear, and Scenario 3—
Desert Ambush) based on three measures-of-effectiveness (MOEs): force exchange ratio 
(FER), indirect-fire kill ratio (IDK), and intelligence time to detect 50% of enemy forces 
(INTEL). Each of the operational scenarios was developed based on selected factors from 
the Army mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 
available, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) (Department of the 
Army 2012a, 1-2). Specifically, each scenario was created with a distinct mission, 
enemy, and terrain using Map-Aware Non-Uniform Automata-Vector (MANA-V) agent-
based-simulation software. This research developed three MOEs that are both 
representative of mission accomplishment in the scenarios and relevant to the study’s 
objective. A single MOE was developed to measure a configuration’s performance in 
each of three warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, and fires) as 
they relate to mission accomplishment. 
After conducting statistical analysis on the data from 500 iterations of each of the 
nine configuration-scenario simulations, the research performed a value-focused multi-
objective decision analysis to evaluate the operational resiliency of the three alternative 
configurations. Specifically, the research employed methods developed by Gregory 
Parnell and Timothy Trainor (2009, 284) to assess “the trade-offs between objectives by 
evaluating the alternative’s contribution to the value measures (a score converted to value 
by single-dimensional value functions) and the relative importance of each value measure 
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(weight).” Accordingly, the research developed MOE-specific value functions and 
scenario-specific swing-weight matrices that combined to result in each configuration’s 
Operational Resiliency Score (OR Score). Based on the selected value-function scales of 
zero to one, a configuration’s OR Score could range from zero to three, with three 
representing the highest operational resiliency. 
This research developed a visual representation of the process, data, and results 
called the Operational Resiliency Decision Block that provides a decision maker the 
opportunity to draw additional conclusions from the results. The block is three-
dimensional with configurations along the length, scenarios along the width, and MOEs 
along the height. The block for this research is three-by-three-by-three, but the design 
allows it to be expanded in any direction to encompass additional configurations, 
scenarios, or MOEs as the process of obtaining the OR Score remains unchanged. Figure 
1 presents the Operational Resiliency Decision Block. 
 
 




The 27 weighted values of the OR Scores for each of the MOE-scenario-
configuration combinations are calculated and placed in the block. The OR Score is then 
determined by first summing weighted values across the MOEs for each scenario-
configuration combination and then across the scenarios. The three configurations’ OR 
Scores are computed and highlighted in red in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. OR Score for each Configuration 
 
 
In the end, this research found that Configuration B, with an OR Score of 2.037, 
is the most operationally resilient. Configuration C follows closely behind at 2.020 while 
Configuration A is the least operationally resilient with an OR Score of 1.705. While the 
two top-scoring configurations are nearly numerically equivalent, it is clear that 
Configuration A is dominated by the other two configurations, particularly in Scenarios 1 
and 2.  The difference in performance between Configuration A and Configurations B 
and C is most likely due to increased combat firepower from the higher number of 
 xxi 
maneuver troops (Bradleys and dismounts) and Apache support in the latter 
configurations. Note that this comprehensive look at the operational resiliency of each 
configuration produces a different conclusion than would be reached through 
examination of the scenarios in isolation. For example, although Configuration A is least 
operationally resilient, it actually performs better than the other two configurations in 
Scenario 3. The decision block affords the decision maker that ability to analyze 
performance across the scenarios. 
To ensure robustness of the results, the research analyzed the nine scenario-MOE 
weighted values for sensitivity. The sensitivity analysis found that the most operationally-
resilient configuration is only sensitive to the weight assessment of one of the nine 
scenario-MOE swing weight values—Scenario 1, INTEL. As seen in Figure 3, when the 
non-normalized swing-weight value for Scenario 1-INTEL MOE falls to 17 or below, 
Configuration C becomes the most operationally resilient. 
 
 




Having developed a method to determine the operational resiliency of a company 
team that is reproducible and relevant, future work can be performed that employs the 
methods used in the study and refines and expands the scope of this study. Although this 
research leveraged configurations from another capstone project, future work could tailor 
the configurations to represent actual or planned task organizations of combined arms 
teams. This analysis could inform maneuver commanders’ decisions regarding company-
level force structures and training given the need to fight and win in an uncertain future. 
Additionally, the design of the Operational Resiliency Decision Block and the analytical 
method contained therein provides the ability to seamlessly incorporate an expansion of 
the decision space. Thus, one could easily expand the decision block to include additional 
unit configurations, operational scenarios, MOEs or any combination of the three, all 
based on the needs of the decision maker. 
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The United States Army’s Operating Concept calls for a force that can “Win in a 
Complex World.”  This mandates that the Army prepare to face an unknown enemy, in 
an unknown environment, with an unknown mission, and with unknown partners 
(TRADOC 2014). When designing, developing, and acquiring military systems, the 
Army assesses its projected operational needs relative to its current capabilities and turns 
an identified gap into a requirement or set of requirements. As such, it is extremely 
difficult to apply this requirement-development methodology to future combat systems 
due to the lack of ability to actually realize the system and the system’s operational 
performance. One such solution is to apply Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
to make early life-cycle-design decisions and requirements for systems of systems (SoS) 
that must operate in a dynamic, unknown future environment. INCOSE defines MBSE as 
“the formalized application of modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, 
verification, and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and 
continuing throughout development and later life-cycle phases” (BKCASE Editorial 
Board 2015). This research seeks to utilize MBSE, along with an agent-based simulation, 
to explore the operational resiliency of an Army company team. 
Previous studies by Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Systems Engineering (SE) 
cohorts have sought to analyze company team performance with regard to various 
capabilities—specifically, the survivability of ground combat vehicles and the 
effectiveness of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). These studies 
produced singular meta-models to analyze tradeoff effects between performance factors 
in a single scenario. This study expands on those earlier studies by applying similar 
techniques to a multi-scenario environment. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This study aims to expound upon earlier research focused on developing a 
conceptual methodology utilizing MBSE techniques for determining the design trade-
 2 
space of various SoS. Prior research focused on analyzing the impact of alterations to 
materiel and non-materiel parameters of a company team in a single scenario. This 
research seeks to develop a method to assess the operational resiliency of a company 
team by simulating various unit configurations against a variety of operational scenarios. 
This is expected to support development of future combat systems by demonstrating a 
new development methodology where the operational scenario is varied to assess the 
utility of new systems against a variety of potential threats in a variety of potential 
operating environments. As a result, the analysis seeks to develop a general methodology 
for analyzing the performance of military SoS through the development of multiple 
operational simulation models. 
1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This research project is governed by the following objectives: 
• Develop multiple operational scenarios that can be utilized in future SoS 
synthesis models by leveraging and evolving existing models for dynamic 
application. 
• Produce an analytic method for assessing operational performance of a 
company team across a range of scenarios. 
• Determine a method for evaluating and displaying multi-dimensional data 
so that the results can be used and trusted. 
2. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY  
The intended purpose of this project is to provide a practical example of how to 
assess a company team’s operational resiliency. This research and the outputs of this 
study provide several benefits. First, it demonstrates that the examination of multiple 
operational simulations early in the system life-cycle is a potentially valuable approach to 
assess the resiliency of future Army combat systems. Secondly, it works to help provide a 
proof-of-principle of the value of MBSE as an analytical method for the Army in the 
form of feeding our analysis into the “dashboard.”  Lastly, it provides a building block 
for doctoral research being done on a general methodology for developing a SoS 
synthesis model and how MBSE can be applied to make early life-cycle-design decisions 
and requirements for SoS. 
 3 
C. ARMY COMPANY TEAM SOS 
This research identifies the Army company team as a representative SoS to which 
the proposed methodology can be applied. It warrants brief discussion of the difference 
between a system and SoS in terms of Army units. Harney (2013, 2) defines a system as 
“[a]n integrated set of equipment, computer programs, facilities, human and logistic 
support resources, and procedures which are assembled to accomplish a single purpose or 
mission.” For the purposes of this research, a system consists of an Army unit that is 
capable of accomplishing a mission given its integrated set of men, weapons, and 
equipment (such as a platoon of dismounted infantry). The Department of Defense 
(DOD) classifies SoS, as a “set or arrangement of systems that results from independent 
systems integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities” (Department of 
Defense 2010, 310). Therefore, SoS are comprised of an arrangement of Army units that, 
when integrated, deliver a unique and improved capability. 
It follows that this research designates an organic company as a system and a 
company team as a SoS. An organic company “is a unit consisting of two or more 
platoons, usually of the same type, with a headquarters and a limited capacity for self-
support” (Department of the Army 2012d, 2-14). This represents the standard task 
organization of any company-sized formation throughout the Army. Depending on 
mission requirements, an organic company’s task organization can be augmented with 
nonorganic assets that are themselves considered systems. Specifically, the addition of 
nonorganic combat multipliers such as tank platoons, field artillery batteries, or aviation 
support transforms the organic company into a company team (Department of the Army 
2012d). The heart of the company team remains the organic company, while the 
nonorganic multipliers represent independent systems that when combined, deliver a 
unique capability set to an operational commander otherwise not present in his or her 
organic formation. Therefore, the Army company-team configurations used in this study 
(see Chapter III) qualify as representative SoS. 
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D. OPERATIONAL RESILIENCY 
The interaction of systems as part of a larger SoS is of particular interest to both 
the Army operational and acquisition communities. The analysis of the operational 
resiliency of an Army company team would provide operational decision makers key 
insights into the effects of setting a resource requirement, namely a limited amount of 
men, weapons, and equipment—both organic and nonorganic. In this project, operational 
resiliency is defined as “the ability of the system to absorb strain and preserve 
functioning despite the presence of adversity” (Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003, 96). This 
definition of operational resiliency is composed of three main components—system, 
functionality, and adversity. In the case of this project, the system refers to the Army 
company team and all potential unit configurations. As will be detailed later, the unit 
configurations are leveraged from previous research on vehicle combat survivability 
(Basala et al. 2013). When considering the system’s ability to preserve functionality, that 
functionality is based off the system’s designed capabilities and operational activities it 
performs. For the purpose of the project, the functionality is traced directly from Army 
doctrine. Lastly, the presence of adversity is provided by the different simulation 
operational scenarios. These operational scenarios have distinct terrain, enemy, and 
mission requirements. 
 Qualitative metrics that enable the assessment of each unit configuration come in 
the form of the measures-of-effectiveness (MOE). The MOEs provide the framework to 
analyze each system’s performance in each operational scenario, affording the context 
with which to evaluate its operational resiliency. The MOEs are tied directly to the 
functionality trying to be preserved and are addressed in Chapter III. The MOE raw 
values will then be analyzed through a value-focused thinking approach to evaluating the 
alternatives developed by Parnell (2007, 619). Specifically, the research will apply 
multiple objective decision analysis through the use of value curves and swing weights to 
ultimately assess the operational resiliency of each company team configuration.  Further 
discussion of the multiple-objective-decision-analysis process can be found in Chapter 
VI. 
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E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The systems engineering (SE) process is used to develop and analyze how a 
variety of SoS, by adjusting unit configurations, performs across a wide spectrum of 
possible scenarios. The SE process model that this research primarily utilizes is outlined 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Systems Engineering Process Model 
 
Source: Harney, Robert C. 2013. Systems Engineering & Integration. Vol. 6 of Combat 
Systems Engineering. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. 
The first step of the SE process presented in Figure 1 is problem definition. As 
presented earlier, this research will test and analyze the operational resiliency of an Army 
company team. This includes determining the various stakeholders and potential users of 
the research results. Additionally, the generic company team architecture is defined and 
modeling strategy with software determined. Since this project is building off previous 
work, the unit configurations are also defined in this step.  
In the second step, the operational scenarios are determined based on selected 
factors from the Army standard METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, 
Troops and Support Available, Time, and Civil Considerations) analysis. Specifically, 
each scenario will be comprised of a distinct mission, enemy, and terrain. In addition, 
MOEs that will be used to evaluate each potential configuration are defined for each 
operational scenario. 
In the third step, the majority of modeling and simulation is executed. The three 
scenarios are developed into their enemy-terrain models. Following that, the unit 
configurations are then added and schemes of maneuver created. Much of the modeling 
refinement effort will be focused on ensuring that the operational fire and maneuver are 
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as close to real-world as possible. This synthesizing step is the most comprehensive and 
time-consuming, with the outputs being the raw value data results from each scenario. 
The fourth and fifth steps are comprised of receiving the simulated raw value 
data, transforming it into the specified MOE, conducting performance comparison 
analysis, and displaying the results. Overall, this model emphasizes the explicitly iterative 
nature of the SE process and displays the immediate feedback between steps. 
Within this process, the research will be employing MBSE. A formal, model-
based approach, versus traditional document-based SE, includes the use of systems-
architecting software, so is more efficient during iterations of the SE process. Particularly 
in comparing and evaluating different company teams, it is crucial to be able rapidly to 
redefine, analyze, and synthesize the unit configurations within the different operational 
scenarios. Ultimately, this method will lead the research to realize the most operationally 
effective and resilient system. 
F. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Traditionally, capstone projects have specific stakeholders, but the goal is to have 
this research prompt more research that is of interest to the following organizations—the 
NPS Systems Engineering Department, the United States Army Maneuver Center of 
Excellence (MCoE), and the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 
Analysis Center (TRAC). As mentioned earlier as a benefit, this work will help provide a 
proof-of-principle of the value of MBSE as an analytical method for the Army in the 
form of feeding analysis into the “dashboard.”  The dashboard and dashboard-related 
activities are being developed by the NPS Systems Engineering Department. This work 
furthers research in the department and will be useful for not only doctoral students 
working in this area, but also for future capstone projects in this area. 
  The second organization that this research may benefit is the MCoE. The MCoE 
ensures the maneuver force is prepared to fight and win in dynamic and unknown future 
engagements. The synthesis of current and emerging technology and doctrine may 
provide MCoE with a means of measuring operational resilience in a SoS. Particularly, 
the MCoE could utilize this method when faced with task organizing units against an 
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unknown enemy with the desire to analyze the operational performance of a few 
configurations to aid in selecting the most operationally resilient option to field. 
The mission of U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) is, in part, 
developing models and simulations for capability development and studying the 
integrated battlefield. TRAC is interested in the Army’s emerging aviation concept of 
manned/unmanned teaming (MUM-T) (Whittle 2015). This research may provide insight 
to the impact of integrating MUM-T capabilities on the battlefield as part of a SoS. This 
project produces meta-models based on agent-based simulation results that could be 
utilized for future analysis in a plug-and-play simulation environment. This type of 
modelling would most likely be employed for rapid analysis and response in a low 
fidelity simulation. 
G. MODELING STRATEGY 
As noted in Siebers, Macal, Garnett, Buxton, and Pidd (2010, 206), “Good 
modelling practice dictates that you should identify the research question, first, and then 
ask what methods would be most applicable in solving it, second.”  Therefore, before 
jumping directly into the chosen modeling strategy, it is important to first examine the 
goal of the project with respect to modeling and simulation. Although the ultimate 
objective is to determine which company team displays the most operational resiliency, 
this section seeks to identify how to accomplish this with modeling and simulation.   
Based on the definition for operational resiliency in the context of this report, the 
strategy must model the ability of a system to absorb strain and preserve functioning 
despite the presence of adversity provided by various operational scenarios. As such, an 
appropriate modeling strategy must be able to model the Army combat system individual 
and collective entities and their abilities to shoot, move, and communicate. Paramount to 
the successful strategy is the modeling of interactions between friendly and enemy forces 
as well as between friendly and friendly forces. Additionally, the modeled system must 
be capable of functioning through the adversity of a changing operational scenario. 
Based on those standards and the guidance presented in Siebers et al. (2010), 
agent-based modeling and simulation is the appropriate solution. Agent-based simulation 
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(ABS) models are “individual based” with a focus on “modelling the entities and 
interactions between them” (207). ABS has the capability to model the behaviors of 
individuals and capture dynamic relationships between agents. Specifically, it allows for 
a bottom-up modelling approach by building the individuals to make up the system. 
Moreover, ABS can account for the spatial and geo-spatial aspects of the forces moving 
across various terrains. This last part is crucial to effectively modelling a land-based 
combat environment and different weapon system and sensor capabilities (207). 
To conduct the ABS for this project, this research selected Map-Aware Non-
Uniform Automata-Vector (MANA-V) software. Major Tobias Treml (2013) gives a 
detailed explanation for reasons for using MANA-V in his thesis, which this research 
summarizes. First, MANA-V employs low resolution yet highly transparent simulation 
models that can be run multiple times quickly and that produce necessary data. Secondly, 
MANA-V allows the user to input and modify necessary combat aspects of each agent 
such as movement speed, weapons lethality, and sensor range; these aspects govern the 
behavior of agents, allowing them to individually act and react. Thirdly, Treml highlights 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis uses the findings of recent capstone projects in systems engineering by 
examining how various company-level force structures react in various scenarios. 
A. A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
FUTURE GROUND COMBAT SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS 
The failure and subsequent cancellation of the acquisition of the U.S. Army’s 
Future Combat System (FCS) project left questions for the acquisition of future systems. 
Major Tobias Treml (2013), an officer in the German Army, sought to create a method 
for providing decision makers with information to reduce cost and schedule impacts 
while maximizing overall system performance.   
Treml synthesized existing combat systems with potential future systems. These 
future systems were created by altering a baseline configuration of some system with 
design specifications that included ranges for parameters set by subject matter experts, 
real-world experiences, and field studies. Treml developed scenarios using the agent-
based combat simulation tool Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata-V (MANA-V) to 
determine the factors that had the most significant impact on SoS performance. 
The result of Treml’s research showed that survivability of ground combat 
vehicles operating as part of a SoS is a result of various factors of the interaction of 
agents in the scenario. Moreover, the method he suggests can feasibly be used as part of 
the up-front analysis of future land-based systems. Treml concludes that active defense 
measure is the most influential factor to the MOEs that combine for survivability. 
Additionally, a combat vehicle’s ability to employ concealment and detect enemy 
positions proved to be influential as well. Of most interest is the singular meta-model 
developed by Treml that can be utilized in future work. This project expands on Treml’s 
general methodology by creating several meta-models that allow for the examination of 
various unit configurations in various scenarios to determine an alternative’s operational 
resiliency in an effort to aid the decision maker. 
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B. VEHICLE SURVIVABILITY TEAM 
An SE capstone project (Basala et al. 2013) investigated using MBSE techniques 
for determining the trade-space of a ground combat vehicle (GCV) as part of a SoS. This 
research sought to find methods of improving the overall survivability of combat vehicles 
beyond the addition of armor. This research determined those factors that most 
influenced survivability and developed a trade-space between survivability, lethality, and 
mobility. 
This research began with the previously discussed model created by Treml. It was 
determined that, given the specific scenario and force composition, four factors including 
armor thickness, weapon range, armor penetration, and unmanned aerial vehicle detection 
range had the greatest impact on unit survivability. It was further concluded that altering 
the force structure increased overall unit performance. That project combined the 
simulation results with cost and MOE analysis and determined that the most cost-
effective method of increasing survivability of the unit was through improvements to 
unmanned aerial vehicle sensors. 
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III. COMPANY TEAM ARCHITECTURE AND MOE 
A. OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
As this project serves to analyze existing company team configurations and not to 
design new ones, it is important to understand the architectural framework of the unit. 
The primary focus of the Army’s operational concept is the ability to conduct unified 
land operations (Department of the Army 2012a, 1-1). In terms of what is required to 
conduct unified land operations, commanders must demonstrate the two core 
competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security (2-1), as shown in 
Figure 2. Combined arms maneuver encompasses the majority of traditional operations 
involving seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative through offensive and defensive 
operations (2-2). Wide area security is primarily focused with retaining the initiative and 
preventing a secure situation from deteriorating through stability operations (2-2). In this 
project, offensive operations are selected as the focus, and therefore will continue 
refining the combined arms maneuver capability. 
Figure 2. Army Company Team Capability 
 
 
A unit capable of successfully executing combined arms maneuver requires the 
ability to generate and apply combat power (Department of the Army 2012a, 3–1), with 
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traceability from unified land operations shown in Figure 3. These are separate 
operational activities in that generating combat power focuses on the buildup and 
replenishment of combat power whereas applying combat power involves units engaged 
with enemy in combat (3-2). These two activities are the basis for combined arms 
maneuver and provide the link to the functional framework of the company team. Combat 
power is defined as “the total means of destructive, constructive, and information 
capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time” (3-1). 
Figure 3. Army Company Team Traceability to Operational Activity 
 
 
B. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
Further decomposing each of the operational activities shown in Figure 3, 
commanders apply combat power through what are called the warfighting functions. The 
six warfighting functions are movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, protection, 
sustainment, and mission command (Department of the Army 2012a, 3-1), as shown in 
Figure 4. Commanders use the six functions to “help them exercise command and to help 
them and their staffs exercise control” (3-2). More specifically, a warfighting function is 
“a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united 
by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions” (3-2).   
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Figure 4. Army Company Team Traceability to Functions 
 
 
The movement and maneuver warfighting function is defined as “the related tasks 
and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of advantage over the 
enemy and other threats” (Department of the Army 2012a, 3-3) and is further 
decomposed into the eight sub-functions shown in Figure 5. 




The intelligence warfighting function is defined as “the related tasks and systems 
that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations” (Department of 
the Army 2012a, 3-4) and is further decomposed into the four sub-functions shown in 
Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Intelligence Functional Decomposition 
 
 
The fires warfighting function is defined as “related tasks and systems that 
provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, 
and joint fires through the targeting process” (Department of the Army 2012a, 3-4) and is 
further decomposed into the three sub-functions shown in Figure 7. 




The protection warfighting function is defined as “related tasks and systems that 
preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish 
the mission” (Department of the Army 2012a, 3-5) and is further decomposed into the 15 
sub-functions shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8. Protection Functional Decomposition 
 
 
The sustainment warfighting function is defined as “related tasks and systems that 
provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and 
prolong endurance” (Department of the Army 2012a, 3-4) and is further decomposed into 
the three sub-functions shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Sustainment Functional Decomposition 
 
 
The mission command warfighting function is defined as “related tasks and 
systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the 
art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting 
functions” (Department of the Army 2012a, 3-2) and is further decomposed into the 12 
sub-functions shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10. Mission Command Functional Decomposition 
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C. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
As mentioned previously, this research leveraged an Army company team 
structure based on a combined arms organization that was used in two earlier capstone 
projects by Treml and the Vehicle Survivability Team. The combined arms Army 
company team is composed of seven components, three ground maneuver assets, two air 
assets, one indirect fire support, and one headquarters command post. The three ground 
assets are the M1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and 
dismounted infantry squads. The two air assets are the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter 
and the RQ-7 Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The indirect fire support is the 
M777 155-millimeter howitzer artillery. Lastly, the headquarters element exists to 
provide command and control, but will primarily be simulated as the crucial 
communications link for generic situational awareness between the elements. These 
seven components are shown in Figure 11. 




In the above figure (Figure 11), the red cones indicate sensor capability of the 
elements and the blue bi-directional arrows indicate direct communication. Only five of 
the elements have the ability to actually sense or see the enemy with varying capability. 
For example, the dismount infantry squads would only be able to detect enemy personnel 
out to a maximum range of 800 meters. On the other end of the detection spectrum, the 
Apache attack helicopter is capable of identifying an enemy vehicle out to nearly 8,000 
meters. The various sensor capabilities of each element utilized in the project can be 
found in Appendix A. 
As for communications, a combined arms company team employs advanced 
technology which allows shared situational understanding of friendly and enemy 
positions on the battlefield. Significantly, the seven elements do not possess the ability to 
directly communicate with each other. The headquarters command post has direct 
communication with two of the three ground elements, both air assets, and the indirect 
fire support assets. Conversely, the UAV can only relay imagery directly to its controller 
located in the headquarters command post. All enemy information identified by the UAV 
would therefore have to be collected and passed to the other elements through other 
command post operators. As a result, the communication of that information incurs a 
time delay penalty in processing time. 
Although not specifically depicted in the OV-1 diagram, only five of the seven 
elements can engage the enemy with fire, with the two impotent elements being the UAV 
and the headquarters command post. The Apache attack helicopter, Abrams tank, Bradley 
fighting vehicle, and dismount infantry squads all have the ability to engage the enemy 
with direct fire assets. For example, the Abrams tank employs a 120 millimeter main gun 
and a .50 caliber machine gun with which to engage and destroy enemy targets. The 
M777 artillery piece is the only element to employ indirect fire capability with a 
maximum range of 14 kilometers and kill radius of 125 meters. The capabilities of the 
various weapons can be found in Appendix A. 
 19 
D. UNIT CONFIGURATIONS 
This research assesses operational resiliency of three different unit configurations. 
Three Army company teams facilitate the multiple-objective-decision-analysis techniques 
utilized to assess operational resiliency and are appropriate in scope in terms of 
simulation-modelling requirements for a team of this size. The three unit configurations 
are leveraged from the Vehicle Survivability Team’s capstone project (Basala et al. 2013) 
and selected specifically as being the three highest ranking alternatives developed in their 
study. In that project, a design of experiments resulted in 22 unique unit configurations. 
Furthermore, each of the 22 configurations maintained a single headquarters command 
post element, but varied the remaining elements from two to six for the ground assets and 
from one to four for the air and indirect fire assets. Table 1 displays the three highest 
ranking alternatives as a result of their analysis. 
Table 1.   Army Company Team Unit Configurations 









A 5 3 3 4 3 2 1
B 3 5 5 4 4 2 1
C 4 5 5 3 4 4 1  
 
E. MEASURES-OF-EFFECTIVENESS 
According to Harney, measures of effectives “must be 
measurable...quantifiable...and relevant (it must directly measure to what degree the real 
objective being studied is achieved)” (Harney 2013, 184). Additionally, they “are used to 
evaluate the performance of the unit in accomplishing the mission” (184). Using this 
definition to guide the research, each MOE must satisfy two requirements. They must 
evaluate the performance of the unit in accomplishing the mission, and directly measure 
to what degree the real objective is achieved. In each operational scenario, the Army 
company team performs an offensive mission designed to defeat an enemy. Mission 
accomplishment is therefore directly linked to identifying, engaging, and destroying 
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enemy personnel. As such, MOEs must satisfy that first requirement of evaluating 
performance of the unit’s ability to accomplish the mission and defeating the enemy. 
Each MOE must also satisfy the requirement of being relevant to the real 
objective of the study. The real objective is to assess the operational resiliency of each 
company team configuration, with their ability to preserve functionality being the key 
point of performance. The functionality of the team stems from the six warfighting 
functions as mentioned earlier. This research focused on three of the six warfighting 
functions as applicable to the project. These three warfighting functions—movement and 
maneuver, intelligence, fires—comprise the functionality desired by the Army company 
team operating in the offense and can be modeled through the simulation technique 
selected. By definition, the sustainment and protection warfighting functions are relevant 
to force preservation and support activities, which are not associated with the direct 
offensive combat missions being modeled and simulated. Additionally, mission 
command was scoped out of the study to reduce the number of operational decisions 
made by the authors and to ensure that any recommendations are focused on the 
configuration of the company team, rather than altered operational decisions. Figure 12 
shows the traceable functional architecture with selected functionality outlined in red. 
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Figure 12. Army Company Team Functionality for MOE Development 
 
 
This research developed three MOEs that satisfy both aforementioned 
requirements of being representative of mission accomplishment and relevant to the 
study’s objective. A single MOE was developed to measure the performance of each of 
the three functions as they relate to mission accomplishment. Doing this allows the 
assessor to capture the representative data and ultimately utilize it in the decision criteria 
for selecting the most operationally resilient unit configuration. 
1. MOE 1—Force Exchange Ratio (FER) 
In analyzing the movement and maneuver warfighting functionality being 
modeled, three of the seven sub-functions are directly modeled and simulated in the 
MANA-V software. These three are maneuver, employ direct fires, and occupy an area 
and are shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Movement and Maneuver MOE Sub-functions 
 
 
The MOE selected that captures the movement and maneuver functionality related 
to mission accomplishment is force exchange ratio (FER). FER is the ratio of two 
casualty ratios and is shown Equation (1.1). The values of FER can range from 0 (in the 
case of only friendly casualties) to very large (in the case of only enemy casualties). This 
ratio of casualty ratios is useful in measuring a unit’s ability to move and maneuver 








FER =   (0.1) 
 
2. MOE 2—Indirect Fire Kill Ratio (IDK) 
In analyzing the fires warfighting functionality being modeled, two of the three 
sub-functions are directly modeled and simulated in the MANA-V software. These are 
the company team’s ability to deliver and integrate fires, and are shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Fires MOE Sub-functions 
 
 
The MOE selected that captures the fires functionality related to mission 
accomplishment is indirect-fire kill ratio (IDK). IDK captures the effectiveness of the 
indirect fire support and is shown in Equation (1.2). For this MOE, a smaller IDK 
represents a more effective indirect fire capability, capturing a unit’s ability to identify 
and engage targets with artillery fire. 
 
  
 # friendly artillery rounds fired
# enemy killed by artillery
IDK =   (0.2) 
 
3. MOE 3—Intelligence Time to Detect 50% of Enemy Forces (INTEL) 
In analyzing the intelligence warfighting functionality being modeled, two of the 
four sub-functions are directly modeled and simulated in the MANA-V software. These 
are the company team’s ability to collect information and support situational 





Figure 15. Intelligence MOE Sub-functions 
 
 
The MOE selected that captures the intelligence functionality related to mission 
accomplishment is the intelligence time to detect 50% of enemy forces (INTEL). INTEL 
captures the unit’s ability to detect and relay enemy position and is shown in Equation 
(1.3). INTEL is measured in seconds with a smaller value representing a unit’s ability to 
more quickly collect and disseminate enemy positions on the battlefield. Enemy detection 




 time of 50th percent enemy detection - time of first enemy detectionINTEL =   (0.3) 
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IV. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The adversity mentioned in the definition of operational resiliency entails the 
element of uncertainty. This uncertainty exists in the presence of the three operational 
scenarios utilized in this study. Each of the operational scenarios was developed based on 
selected factors from the Army mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, 
troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC). The 
use of mission variables help refine leaders’ understanding of the operational situation 
and ensure they consider the most “relevant information about conditions that pertain to 
the mission” (Department of the Army 2012a, 1–2). Specifically, each scenario was 
developed with a distinct mission, enemy, and terrain. 
A. SCENARIO 1—MOUNTAIN ATTACK 
1. Mission 
The mission each unit configuration executes in this first scenario is an attack. 
Specifically, the mission statement is Company A attacks to seize Objective (OBJ) 
Blackbrier in order to allow the battalion’s main effort freedom of maneuver on 
Objective Cheshire. The Army defines seize as a “tactical mission task that involves 
taking possession of a designated area using overwhelming force” (Department of the 
Army 2012b, 1–33). Further, attack is defined as an “offensive task that destroys of 
defeats the enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both” (Department of the Army 
2012b, 1–4). The focus for this mission is the seizure of OBJ Blackbrier, accomplished 












The enemy developed for this scenario is modeled after the force designed by 
Treml (2013). The enemy force each company team faces in this scenario represents what 
this research considered a near-peer threat, meaning that it more closely matches the 
friendly elements in weaponry, organization, communications, and ability than do the 
other scenarios. This force contains a platoon-plus sized element with armored tank 
support. The platoon is comprised of three dismounted infantry squads of eight personnel 
each, complimented by two medium-caliber machine guns, an anti-armor section, and 
two dismounted anti-aircraft missile systems. Figure 17 depicts the disposition of the 
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platoon on the battlefield, with two distinct locations. The two anti-armor sections are 
placed north of the platoon’s main element, in an ambush position. They are each secured 
by an infantry team from one of the dismounted infantry squads. The remainder of the 
force is located on OBJ Blackbrier in dug-in defensive positions. The centerpiece of the 
position is the platoon-sized defensive position occupied by the tanks. On their left and 
right flanks are squad-sized defensive positions of a dismounted infantry. Co-located with 
these squads is an anti-aircraft team each. 




Table 2 provides the strength of the enemy force in terms of the weapons systems. 
The capabilities of each of the enemy’s weapon systems and sensors can be found in 
Appendix A. 




The terrain for this scenario mirrors the one employed in Treml (2013). The 
battlefield modeled is a 30 kilometer by 40 kilometer box generically described as rural 
countryside with mountainous elevation near the objective. The northern portion of the 
terrain map allows for unrestricted tactical movement by the friendly force mechanized 
and armor vehicles as well as for the employment of weapon systems and sensors at their 
maximum effective range. Increased elevation and vegetation in the southern area of the 
map, particularly in and around OBJ Blackbrier, favors the established defense. It reduces 
mobility for the tracked vehicles and provides cover for the enemy. The specific values 
for how mobility, cover, concealment, and elevation were modeled in this terrain are 
provided in Appendix B. 
B. SCENARIO 2—URBAN CLEAR 
1. Mission 
The mission each unit configuration executes in the second scenario is the 
clearance of an urban town. Specifically the mission statement is Company A clears OBJ 
Atwood in order to deny the enemy a foothold in the battalion’s area of operation. The 
Weapon System Element Qty per Element Number of Elements Total Qty
Dismounted Infantry Squad 8 3
Anti-Aircraft Missile Team 1 2
Anti-Armor Section 1 2
PKM Med MG Machine Gun Team 1 2 2
12.7mm Heavy MG Tank Platoon 4 1 4
125mm Cannon Tank Platoon 4 1 4
Kornet Anti-Tank Missile Anti-Armor Section 1 2 2
SA-18 Anti-Aircraft Missile Team 1 2 2
AK-47 28
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Army defines clear as a “tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all 
enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area” (Department of 
the Army 2012b, 1–7). A graphical depiction of this mission is illustrated in Figure 18. 




The enemy force modeled for this scenario represents a loose collection of 
dismounted infantry teams spread throughout an urban city. They have unreliable 
communications, are not very well organized, and present the least capable threat of the 
three scenarios. This enemy is essentially a platoon-sized element, augmented by 
machine gun teams and indirect fire support. The platoon is comprised of six three-man 
teams each with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), four machine gunners, a two-man 
observation post (OP), and a single 120mm mortar firing position. Figure 19 depicts the 
disposition of the enemy throughout the town. The OP is emplaced on the eastern edge of 
the town, closest to the anticipated direction of attack from the friendly forces. This two-
man position is watching over two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) emplaced along 
the main avenues of approach into the town. The six dismounted teams are disbursed 
throughout the town. The four machine guns are located at positions that provide 
observation over and the ability to place direct fire along the main roads in the town. 
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Finally, the enemy’s indirect fire support is located to the west of the town in a small 
grove of trees, able to place fire on the entirety of the objective and on any possible 
approach into the town from the east. 
Figure 19. Scenario 2 Enemy Force Disposition 
 
 
Table 3 provides the strength of the enemy force in terms of the weapons systems. 
The capabilities of each of the enemy’s weapon systems and sensors can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Table 3.   Scenario 2 Enemy Force Weapon Systems 
 
 
Weapon System Element Qty per Element Number of Elements Total Qty
Dismounted Infantry Team 3 6
RPG Team 1 6
RPG-7 Dismounted Infantry Team 1 6 6
PKM Med MG Machine Gun Team 1 4 4
IED Observation Post 2 1 2




The terrain for this scenario was developed uniquely by this research. It is 
modeled after the military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) training site at Joint Base 
Lewis-McChord, Washington. The battlefield modeled is a four kilometer by two 
kilometer box, mostly flat urban terrain that is boarded by dense forest on the eastern and 
southern sides. The forest represents severely restricted terrain for both mounted and 
dismounted troops but provides excellent cover. The terrain to the north and west of the 
town is flat with intermittent scrub brush that provides no cover or concealment, but 
allows for the long-range use of sensors and weapon systems. Improved one-lane roads 
led into and throughout the town. The town itself is comprised of a variety of two and 
three-story concrete buildings that provide cover and concealment to those that occupy 
them. The urban setting restricts the use of ground based sensors and weapon systems to 
line of sight. The specific values for how mobility, cover, concealment, and elevation 
were modeled in this terrain are provided in Appendix B. 
C. SCENARIO 3—DESERT AMBUSH 
1. Mission 
The mission each unit configuration executes in the third scenario is to conduct a 
tactical movement through a desert terrain to a key leader engagement (KLE). 
Specifically, the mission statement is Company A secures the Company Commander 
along Route Berry to the Afghan district headquarters in order to facilitate a 
governmental KLE. The Army defines secure as a “tactical mission task that involves 
preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a 
result of enemy action” (Department of the Army 2012b, 1-33). A graphical depiction of 










This is a unique enemy force for this study as it is one that is on the tactical 
offense. This force establishes a deliberate position along RTE Berry in order to ambush 
the friendly forces as they travel along the route. The enemy force modeled here is not as 
well equipped as depicted in the first scenario but is more so than that of the enemy in 
Scenario 2. This force has more reliable communications and increased capabilities. This 
enemy, too, is the equivalent of a platoon-sized element, augmented by medium tactical 
vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons. The platoon is comprised of two dismounted infantry 
squads each complimented with an RPG gunner and a machine gun, a third squad 
manning the heavy machine guns on the tactical vehicles, two anti-aircraft missile system 
teams, and a two-man OP. Figure 21 depicts the disposition of the enemy in their 
coordinated ambush positions. The OP is placed on the eastern edge of the elevated 
ridgeline just to the south of RTE Berry, overlooking the approach to the designated 
engagement area. The two dismounted squads have established ambush positions along 
the same ridgeline, one on each side of the RTE. The anti-aircraft missile teams are 
located at the highest point of each piece of elevated terrain flanking the road. Finally, the 
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two medium tactical vehicles are hidden behind defilade positions on either side of the 
road and once the ambush has been initiated, will assume the support by fire positions 
indicated by the dashed icons. 
Figure 21. Scenario 3 Enemy Force Disposition 
 
 
Table 4 provides the strength of the enemy force in terms of the weapons systems. 













The terrain for this scenario was developed uniquely by this research. It is 
modeled on a known ambush training location at the National Training Center located at 
Fort Irwin, California. The battlefield modeled is an eight kilometer by five kilometer 
box with rolling desert terrain that leads into a small valley created by elevated terrain, 
notably the ridgelines, along either side of the road. The open desert provides little in the 
way of cover and concealment, is unrestricted to mounted and dismounted forces, and 
allows for the long-range use of sensors and weapon systems. The route is an un-
improved two-lane road that allows for high-speed movement in either direction. The 
ridgeline provides excellent observation of the valley and the road leading into it, along 
with cover and concealment to forces on the backside facing away from the road. The 
elevation also affords the enemy the long-range use of its weapons and sensors, along 
with the tactically advantageous position of the high ground. The specific values for how 
mobility, cover, concealment, and elevation were modeled in this terrain are provided for 
in Appendix B. 
D. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATIONS 
This research ensures that the actions of both the friendly and enemy units in each 
of the three scenarios remain as doctrinally realistic as possible. In an effort to replicate 
those tactics in a simulation model that an Army company team employs, this research 
implements priorities of fire for weapon systems and leverages the operational experience 
Weapon System Element Qty per Element Number of Elements Total Qty
Dismounted Infantry Squad 8 2
RPG Team 1 2
Anti-Aircraft Missile Team 1 2
RPG-7 RPG Team 1 2 2
PKM Med MG Machine Gun Team 1 2 2
12.7mm Heavy MG Med Tactical Vehicle 1 2 2
IED Observation Post 1 2 2
SA-18 Anti-Aircraft Missile Team 1 2 2
AK-47 20
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of the research group members gained from leading soldiers in combat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
United States Army doctrine provides succinct summaries of current tactics that 
guide simulation development in this research. “The Infantry company commander must 
effectively plan to focus, distribute, and shift the overwhelming mass of his direct fire 
capability at critical locations and times to succeed on the battlefield” (Department of the 
Army 2006, 9-1). Part of the tactics involved in effectively employing direct fire assets 
are direct fire control measures, which the Army defines as “the means by which the 
Infantry company commander…control[s] direct fires” (Department of the Army 2006, 
9-9). There exist a number of direct fire control measures, with some being terrain-based 
and others threat-based. This research uses a threat-based control measure called 
priorities of fire. This type of control measure provides specific guidance for which type 
of enemy targets a weapon can engage. The use of priorities of fire in a modeling 
construct such as MANA-V serves to also drive the tactical movements of forces, as 
agents move to engage targets based on these prescribed priorities. This research employs 
priorities of fire for both enemy and friendly weapons systems. 
1. Friendly Forces Priorities of Fire 
Armored vehicles such as the Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting 
vehicles prioritize their heavy-caliber main guns first on enemy armored/tactical vehicles 
and then on the enemy’s most casualty-producing weapons such as machine guns, RPGs, 
and anti-air and armor systems. The machine guns mounted on the tanks and Bradleys are 
then focused on dismounted troops. Machine gunners place their emphasis on enemy 
machine guns and RPGs first and then seek to engage dismounted troops.  
The close-combat-aviation assets in the form of the AH-64 Apache helicopters 
prioritize their Hellfire-missile engagements on enemy vehicles. The employment of their 
30mm machine starts with high-casualty-producing weapons and progresses down to 
dismounted troops. Finally, friendly indirect-fire assets prioritize the engagement of 
enemy indirect-fire assets followed by the engagement of vehicles. 
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2. Enemy Forces Priorities of Fire 
A similar approach is applied to enemy forces. Enemy vehicles focus their efforts 
on friendly armored forces. Anti-armor forces only engage friendly armored elements 
while anti-aircraft weapons target only the Apaches. To replicate the operational 
employment of the RQ-7 Shadow UAVs, which flies at an elevation that makes them 
nearly impossible to be heard or seen, they are not able to be detected or engaged by any 
enemy forces. Enemy RPGs focus their efforts initially on armored vehicles and then 
transition to machine-gun teams. The IEDs are designed to be triggered by the OPs and 
thus target vehicles only, in an effort to inflict the most significant damage possible. 
Dismounted troops, both enemy and friendly, employ their small arms against 
dismounted elements. 
3. Other Tactical Considerations 
The other method this research utilizes to replicate real-world tactics in the 
models is to leverage the personal operational experience of the research group. This 
manifests in such ways as the order-of-movement of friendly units, means-of-
employment of aerial elements, and reactions to enemy contact. Armor units lead the 
ground force movement in each of the three scenarios as they are ideally suited to survive 
initial contact with an enemy force, contain enough inherent offensive capability to 
suppress the enemy, and thus allow the remaining forces to maneuver on the enemy.  
Prior operational experience suggests that both Shadows and Apaches are capable 
reconnaissance elements. They each provide a valuable picture of the terrain leading up 
to and on the mission objective. They are also used to observe and report on pieces of key 
terrain and natural choke points that create advantageous positions for the enemy. The 
Apaches are also uniquely suited to engage targets they identify forward of the ground 
element to reduce the risk to soldiers on the ground.  
In reacting to enemy contact, it is a typical tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) 
to stop personnel carriers, such as the Bradley, to allow the soldiers in the back to 
dismount and begin to maneuver on the enemy. Once the enemy localized in that location 
no longer presents a threat, the soldiers re-mount the vehicles and continue on to their 
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objective. These efforts are incorporated into the modeling of each scenario in an effort to 
replicate the actual tactics that an Army company team would employ in combat. 
E. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION 
To facilitate subsequent research in replicating this research’s models, two points 
stand worth mentioning—the number of runs and the stopping conditions employed for 
each scenario. 
1. Number of Iterations 
This research conducts 500 iterations for each of the nine configuration-scenario 
simulations for a total of 4,500 iterations. Based on the speed of an average computer’s 
central processing unit, a single iteration for any of the nine simulations runs to 
completion in approximately 60 seconds. MANA-V does possess a multi-run feature that 
expedites each iteration, but not significantly. Due to the stochastic nature of MANA-V, 
500 replications are necessary to capture the variability within each scenario and to 
determine the statistical significance of the results. 
2. Stopping Conditions 
Stopping conditions are used to control the length of each iteration while 
simultaneously allowing enough simulation to occur.  The stopping conditions present the 
point at which the scenario-specific mission objectives would be achieved. Stopping 
conditions for Scenarios 1 and 2 are event-based, while Scenario 3 is time-based.  For 
Scenarios 1 and 2, the stopping-condition event is the force level at which point the unit 
becomes combat-ineffective. It is at this point that a unit is no longer capable of 
continuing its mission and would stop forward movement, attempt to establish fire 
superiority and pass another unit onto the objective, or simply withdraw from the 
engagement. Combat ineffectiveness is determined by unit strength; specifically, if a unit 
is reduced to 50-70% of its initial strength, it is considered to be combat ineffective 
(Department of the Army 1997, C-2).  In Scenarios 1 and 2, an enemy would withdraw 
when reduced to 50% of its initial strength and the friendly forces would successfully 
complete their mission. Conversely, if the friendly forces are reduced to 70% strength, 
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then the commander would be forced to withdraw or call for reinforcements, either way 
effectively ending the mission for the company team. 
As previously stated, Scenario 3’s stopping condition is time-based. The mission 
in Scenario 3 is to secure the company commander to a KLE. The essence of the unit’s 
ability to secure the commander, however, is illustrated in whether or not they can fight 
their way out of the enemy’s ambush. The research determines that after 5,000 model 
steps, the unit reaches a point where they either successfully defeat the enemy in the 
ambush location or are themselves defeated. The enemy in this scenario employs a fight-
to-the-death mentality and thus do not withdraw even if rendered combat-ineffective. 
Thus, the time-based condition is prudent for this final scenario. 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. RESULTS BY INDIVIDUAL MOE 
The research conducted preliminary data analysis to examine the variability of 
each MOE within each scenario. This analysis demonstrates that there is a significant 
difference between the performance of at least one configuration for at least one MOE in 
each scenario, which emphasizes that detailed analysis of each MOE and each scenario is 
necessary to identify the most operationally resilient configuration. 
1. Means and Confidence Intervals 
As described in Chapter IV, the research simulates 500 runs for each of the nine 
configuration-scenario combinations. The relevant data from the various MANA-V 
output files produces 500 data points for each of the 27 configuration-scenario-MOE 
combinations. The means and 95% confidence intervals for those 27 configuration-
scenario-MOE data sets are presented in Tables 5-7, with each table containing a 
different scenario’s statistics. Upon first review of the data, the raw values come in 
generally as expected with MOE values affected by scenario. The research does not find 
any outliers in these data sets. 






Mean 1.47 1.78 1.86
95% C.I. (1.44, 1.50) (1.76, 1.80) (1.84, 1.88)
Mean 4.80 4.45 4.58
95% C.I. (4.44, 5.15) (4.10, 4.80) (4.19, 4.97)
Mean 981.35 879.63 1013.87









Table 6.   Scenario 2 Data Summary by Configuration and MOE 
 
 
Table 7.   Scenario 3 Data Summary by Configuration and MOE 
 
 
2. Data Distribution and Boxplots 
The comparison of boxplots shows the reader the similarities and differences in 
data distributions. When analyzing Figures 22-24, note that MOE values for a particular 
configuration vary according to scenario. This emphasizes the purpose for assessing 
performance across multiple scenarios. Overall, most of the distributions are fairly 
symmetric, with the exceptions noted below. Additionally, it is pertinent to note that 
Configurations B and C experience the most similarity in raw values and distributions. 
This is expected due to their similarity in unit configuration. 
Figure 22 shows the boxplots for Scenario 1 data grouped by MOE (FER, IDK, 
INTEL left to right) with Configurations A, B, and C individual boxplots ordered left to 
right as well. Note the much larger distribution spread of Configuration A-FER data in 
A B C
Mean 1.11 1.30 1.31
95% C.I. (1.09, 1.13) (1.28, 1.32) (1.29, 1.33)
Mean 12.97 10.89 9.67
95% C.I. (12.36, 13.58) (10.41, 11.37) (9.23, 10.11)
Mean 940.54 678.14 690.26









Mean 4.33 6.18 5.02
95% C.I. (4.18, 4.48) (5.95, 6.40) (4.83, 5.22)
Mean 5.91 6.60 6.59
95% C.I. (5.78, 6.04) (6.45, 6.74) (6.41, 6.77)
Mean 1488.55 1495.42 1516.73









the left box compared to the other two configurations’ FER data. This highlights 
Configuration A’s poor performance where 25% of its runs yield lower results than any 
found in the other two configurations. Separately, IDK and INTEL boxplots (middle and 
right, respectively) for the three configurations each show similar distributions across the 
configurations. Of these two, IDK data appears to be the most similar among the 
configurations with all three being slightly skewed. 




Boxplots for Scenario 2 are organized the same as for Scenario 1 and shown in 
Figure 23. In this scenario, the boxplots across all three MOEs seemingly show 
similarities between Configurations B and C. Note also that Configuration A’s INTEL 
data distribution is significantly higher than the same data for the other configurations, 
highlighting its lesser ability to gather enemy intelligence during simulation. 





In Figure 24, none of Scenario 3’s MOE-specific boxplots show disparity among 
the configurations. These boxplots have the most symmetric distributions of the three 
scenarios. In particular, INTEL data for the three configurations appear the most identical 
of all the MOE boxplots presented. 




3. IDK Variable Transformation 
Note that raw values on a given run for two of the MOEs (FER and IDK) have the 
possibility of being undefined due to the potential zero in the denominator.  Fortunately, 
in the case of FER [see Equation (1.1)], stopping conditions prevent the situation that all 
enemy forces are killed and therefore result in no FER calculations with a zero 
denominator. Unfortunately, in the case of IDK [see Equation (1.2)], at least one of the 
500 runs in every set of runs results in zero enemy killed by artillery fire. Even when no 
enemy is killed by artillery, it is still important to account for those rounds fired. In order 
to preserve the data in those runs, the research employs a variable transformation as 
recommended in Hayter (2012). As a result, a one is added to the denominator for all 
IDK values as shown in Equation (1.4). 
 
 # friendly artillery rounds fired
# enemy killed by artillery 1
IDK =
+
  (0.4) 
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The variable transformation is incorporated in all values for IDK in this chapter 
(Chapter V). As such, the data-distribution analyses and pairwise comparisons use these 
transformed IDK values. 
B. PAIRWISE COMPARISONS 
The research employed additional statistical methods to make inferences about the 
data.  Specifically, the research conducted pairwise comparisons (Hayter 2012, 511) of 
the MOE means to analyze parity of the data.  In each scenario, the mean for a 
configuration’s MOE raw value is compared to the means of the other two 
configurations’ MOE raw values. For Scenario 1, Tables 8 and 10 show that two of the 
MOEs (FER and INTEL) are statistically different, evident by the significant p-values 
(all less than 0.01). Conversely, Table 9 shows that the IDK values in each configuration 
are not significantly different from each other, as evident by the large p-value (all above 
0.18). 
Table 8.   Scenario 1 FER Pairwise Comparisons 
 
 






Table 10.   Scenario 1 INTEL Pairwise Comparisons 
 
 
The analysis results for Scenario 2 are substantially different from the analysis 
results for Scenario 1. In Scenario 2, Tables 12 and 13 show that two of the MOEs (IDK 
and INTEL) are statistically different, resulting in significant p-values (all less than 0.01). 
Similarly, Table 11 shows the statistical difference for FER from Configurations C to A 
and Configurations B to A. The FER values between Configurations C and B are the only 
data not statistically different (p-value of 0.3872). 
Table 11.   Scenario 2 FER Pairwise Comparisons 
 
 
Table 12.   Scenario 2 IDK Pairwise Comparisons 
 
 




In Scenario 3, Tables 14–16 show that seven of the nine MOE comparisons are 
statistically different, evident by the significant p-values (all less than 0.01).  The IDK 
values between Configurations B and C (p-value of 0.9323) and the INTEL values 
between Configurations A and B (p-value of 0.3933) are the notable exceptions. 
Table 14.   Scenario 3 FER Pairwise Comparisons 
 
 
Table 15.   Scenario 3 IDK Pairwise Comparisons 
 
 
Table 16.   Scenario 3 INTEL Pairwise Comparisons 
 
 
Note that traditional analysis would lead the research to disregard an MOE that 
shows parity across configurations. As an example, if only Scenario 1 is examined, one 
would conclude there is no difference in terms of IDK for any of the configurations. 
Examining the data in terms of operational resiliency leads to a different conclusion. 
Looking at IDK in Scenario 2, it is clear there is a significant difference between IDK 
values from the configurations. By examining the performance of three different 
configurations in three different scenarios for the three different MOEs, the resultant 
recommended configuration is not sensitive to a single scenario or MOE. 
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VI. MULTI-OBJECTIVE DECISION ANALYSIS 
A. ADDITIVE VALUE MODEL PROCESS 
The research uses the additive value model within multi-objective decision 
analysis to evaluate the operational resiliency of the three alternative configurations.  As 
Gregory Parnell and Timothy Trainor (2009, 284) point out, “the additive value model 
quantitatively assesses the trade-offs between objectives by evaluating the alternative’s 
contribution to the value measures (a score converted to value by single-dimensional 
value functions) and the relative importance of each value measure (weight).” Equation 
(1.5) is used to evaluate each configuration’s operational resiliency, called the 
Operational Resiliency Score (OR Score), as adapted from the general additive model 
(Parnell 2007, 629). An important note is that since “neither the value functions...or the 
weights...depend on the alternatives,” then this method is very useful “when comparing 
significantly different system concepts, architectures, designs, and alternatives in any life 
cycle state” (MacCalman and Parnell 2015, 6).  
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The value functions, or value curves, show the “returns to scale of the value 
measures” by translating “the raw value measure data into a common scale typically 
between 0 and 100 (0 and 1 or 0 and 10 are also frequently used)” (MacCalman and 
Parnell 2015, 5). For this project, a scale of 0 to 1 is used for all value curves. The 
research employs Parnell’s (2007, 629) suggested technique to develop the value curves 
by first “determining the shape of the value curve: linear, concave, convex, or S-curve” 
and then using “value increments to identify several points on the curve.” Figure 25 
shows the four general shapes previously mentioned. Value curves are generated for each 
of the three MOEs (FER, IDK, INTEL) based on the authors’ collective experience and 
generally-accepted Army TTPs. Moreover, the value curves are consistent across the 
scenarios and account for the expected and relevant range of raw-value data from each 
MOE. The specific value curves are found in Section B of this chapter. 
Figure 25. Value Curve Shapes that represent Returns to Scale 
 
Source: MacCalman, Alex, and Gregory Parnell. 2015. “Multiobjective Decision 
Analysis with Probability Management for Systems Engineering Trade-off Analysis.” 
Paper is scheduled to be presented at the Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences in Kauai, Hawaii in January 2016. 
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Although a myriad of weight-assessment techniques exist, the research utilizes 
Parnell’s Swing Weight Matrix Method (2007, 630).  This method “explicitly defines the 
two major weighting factors: importance and variation prior to the weighting assessment” 
(631). Figure 26 is an example shell matrix that shows the value-measure importance 
across the top and the range of value-measure variation along the left side. While 
employing this method, the “levels of importance and variability...should be defined in 
terms appropriate for the systems decision” (Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson 2011, 334). 
In this project, swing weight values range from one to 100 with the highest swing weight 
occupying the upper-left corner and the lowest swing weight occupying the lower-right 
corner. Within each matrix, “weights should descend in magnitude as we move in a 
diagonal direction from the top left to the bottom right” (336). Moreover, the only strict 
relationship governing each matrix is that the measures placed in any single cell must be 
greater than all those measures placed in cells to the right and below it (336). 
Figure 26. Generic Swing Weight Matrix 
 
Adapted from Parnell, Gregory S. 2007. “Value-focused Thinking.” In Methods for 
Conducting Military Operational Analysis, edited by Andrew G. Loerch, 619–56. 
Virginia: Military Operations Research Society. 
For each scenario, the research places the three MOEs in one of the nine cells 
based on the intersection of their importance and range of variation.  Once all three are 
placed in their cells, they are assigned non-normalized swing-weight values of one to 
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100, where jkf  is the non-normalized swing weight of the 
thk MOE value measure in the 











  (0.6) 
  
This technique of generating a swing-weight matrix per scenario is appropriate in 
this context of operational-resiliency evaluation. This highlights the point that depending 
on the mission or scenario, certain functionalities, and therefore their corresponding 
MOEs, may be more critical to a unit’s mission success. For example, indirect fire 
capability would be more valuable in reacting to an ambush than it would be in clearing 
an urban environment. Accordingly, one would expect the non-normalized swing-weight 
values for IDK to reflect that value difference across the scenarios. Further discussion of 
the varying importance of MOE per scenario as well as the specific swing-weight 
matrices are found in Section C of this chapter (Chapter VI). 
Overall, the additive value model yields values in a specific range dictated by the 
scale used in the value curves. This is due to the fact that the normalized swing weights 
use a ratio scale and sum up to one; therefore, they are not a driver for the range. As such, 
a scale of zero to 10 or zero to 100 will produce scores commensurate with those values. 
Since this research selects value-function scales with a maximum value of one, the OR 
Score follows accordingly. For a configuration’s OR Score, the score can range from zero 
to three, with three representing the highest operational resiliency. 
B. VALUE CURVES 
As discussed in Section A of this chapter (Chapter VI), value curves translate raw 
value data into a common scale. This research generates unique values curves for each of 
the three MOEs by employing Parnell’s (2007) technique for value-curve development. 
Operational experience first determined the initial shape of each value curve and second, 
identified points along the curve for further refinement. 
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1. Force Exchange Ratio (FER) 
The nature of FER dictates an S-curve to represent its value function. A value of 
one reflects poor operational performance—friendly and enemy forces attrite at an equal 
rate—and as such has little to no value. The value of a specific FER above one then 
increases dramatically, following the shape of the S-curve, until reaching a plateau at an 
FER value of two.  Any FER value greater than two is equally exceptional, as it 
represents friendly-to-enemy attrition at a 2:1 ratio or better. The inflection point for this 
value curve lies at an FER value of 1.4. This represents the point at which both the 
friendly and enemy forces have become combat ineffective as discussed in Chapter IV, 
Section E, where friendly forces reduce to 70% and enemy forces to 50%. As such, the 
research assesses the value of 0.5 to an FER value of 1.4.  Figure 27 depicts the value 
curve for the FER MOE with the nine scenario-configuration points displayed. 
Figure 27. FER Value Curve 
 
 
The points from Scenario 3 (Ambush scenario) are all above four and achieve the 
maximum value of one. Being that the enemy is on the tactical offensive in this scenario, 
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one would expect the FER to be much lower. However, the capabilities of the company 
team overcome that tactical advantage for each of the scenarios. The Apaches and 
Shadows operate out in front of the ground element, are able to identify targets earlier, 
and pass their locations through the company headquarters to the field artillery element. 
With the enemy determined to inflict as much damage as possible and not withdraw, the 
company team configurations are also better able to find, fix, and finish the enemy.  
Based on the value function assignment presented earlier, Equation (1.7) displays 
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Figure 28 provides a demonstration of how the value curve is used to determine 
the FER single-dimensional value for Configuration A in Scenario 1. 





Table 17 presents the remaining single-dimensional values for FER. 
Table 17.   FER Single-Dimensional Values by Configuration and Scenario 
,1, ,1, ,1,
,2, ,2, ,2,
Configuration A Configuration B Configuration C
Scenario 1 ( ) 0.552 ( ) 0.759 ( ) 0.799
Scenario 2 ( ) 0.297 ( ) 0.424 ( ) 0.434
Scenario 3 (
FER A FER FER B FER FER C FER
FER A FER FER B FER FER C FER
FER
v x v x v x




,3, ,3, ,3,) 0.999 ( ) 0.999 ( ) 0.999A FER FER B FER FER C FERx v x v x= = =  
 
2. Indirect Fire Kill Ratio (IDK) 
The nature of IDK dictates the value curve shape is an inverse S-curve. This 
shape demonstrates that smaller IDK raw values are better (i.e., it takes fewer indirect-
fire rounds to eliminate an enemy threat). The two points used to develop this curve are 
the IDK raw values of four and 10. IDK raw values of four or less are all given single-
dimensional values of 0.95 and above, as they represent it taking at most a single round-
per-gun for a battery of four 155mm-howitzers to destroy a target. The IDK raw value of 
10 represents the inflection point for this curve and is assessed a single-dimensional value 
of 0.5. This valuation is based upon the assumption that a single 155mm-artillery round 
carries a percent of incapacitation (PI) of 10% out to a distance of 125 meters 
(Department of the Army 2007, 2-11). A PI of 10% therefore implies that one soldier in 
ten will be rendered incapacitated by the effects of the 155mm round at that distance. 
Taken from the inverse perspective, on average, it takes ten rounds to incapacitate or 
destroy a single target. Figure 29 depicts the IDK value curve with the points from the 







Figure 29. IDK Value Curve 
 
 
Notably, the three data points for Scenario 2 (Urban scenario) are all above 25 
and achieve the minimum value of zero. In this instance, the indirect fire assets have 
much fewer targets to engage, their ability to engage targets within the town is restricted 
by concerns over collateral damage, and the town’s buildings provide excellent cover for 
the enemy to use to protect themselves from the incoming rounds. For those reasons, the 
raw values for IDK in that scenario are high, yielding very low single-dimensional 
values.  
Note that these IDK values differ from those in Chapter V because they omit the 
transformation and instead they sum the totals across the 500 runs for the number of 
friendly artillery rounds fired and the number of enemy killed by artillery. Those totals 
are then divided appropriately according to Equation (1.2) to yield the IDK raw values 
used by this value function. Based on the value function assignment presented earlier, 
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The process for determining the single-dimensional values for all nine scenario-
configuration combinations for the IDK remains unchanged from that described in the 
previous section.  Thus, the single-dimensional values for IDK are displayed in Table 18. 
Table 18.   IDK Single-Dimensional Values by Configuration and Scenario 
,1, ,1, ,1,
,2, ,2, ,2,
Configuration A Configuration B Configuration C
Scenario 1 ( ) 0.069 ( ) 0.056 ( ) 0.023
Scenario 2 ( ) 0.000 ( ) 0.000 ( ) 0.000
Scenario 3 (
IDK A IDK IDK B IDK IDK C IDK
IDK A IDK IDK B IDK IDK C IDK
IDK
v x v x v x




,3, ,3, ,3,) 0.875 ( ) 0.834 ( ) 0.837A IDK IDK B IDK IDK C IDKx v x v x= = =
 
 
3. Intelligence Time to Detect 50% of Enemy Forces (INTEL) 
For the final value curve, the nature of INTEL dictates a convex increasing return-
to-scale curve. The shape of this curve reflects the notion that the longer it takes to 
develop a picture of where the enemy is on the battlefield, the significantly less value that 
information carries to an operational commander. The two points chosen to further refine 
the curve correspond to INTEL times of 15 minutes and 30 minutes.  Based on the 
authors’ personal experience, a highly-trained quick reaction force (QRF) can deploy to 
reinforce another unit-in-contact within 15 minutes of notification. Thus, if a commander 
or battle captain knows the location of at least 50% of the enemy forces in contact with 
their unit, he or she can make a well-informed decision as to whether or not to launch the 
QRF. This time is assessed a single-dimensional value of 0.7, meaning that this time is 
good enough to make an effective decision but could most certainly be improved upon. 
The second time of 30 minutes, double that of the threshold length of 15 minutes, 
illustrates how little value the information carries the longer it takes to gather and is 
assessed a single-dimensional value of 0.2.  Take note that the raw values for INTEL 
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used in the value curve equation are in minutes.  Figure 30 displays the INTEL value 
curve with the points from the nine scenario-configuration combinations. 
Figure 30. INTEL Value Curve 
 
 
Based on the value function assignment presented, Equation (1.9) displays the 
mathematical expression for INTEL. 
 
 ,,( ) 2.45  (0.91987486) ij INTEL
x
INTEL ij INTELv x = ∗   (0.9) 
 
 
The single-dimensional values for INTEL are determined by the same process 
used for the other two MOEs.  As such, the single-dimensional values for INTEL are 





Table 19.   Intel Single-Dimensional Values by Configuration and Scenario 
,1, ,1, ,1,
,2, ,2, ,2,
Configuration A Configuration B Configuration C
Scenario 1 ( ) 0.625 ( ) 0.720 ( ) 0.597
Scenario 2 ( ) 0.662 ( ) 0.953 (
INTEL A INTEL INTEL B INTEL INTEL C INTEL
INTEL A INTEL INTEL B INTEL INTEL C INT
v x v x v x





Scenario 3 ( ) 0.309 ( ) 0.306 ( ) 0.297
EL





C. SWING WEIGHTS 
As mentioned in Section A, the swing weight matrices must factor in the relative 
importance and range of variation of the MOEs in each scenario. For an Army company 
team, the relative importance of an MOE depends on how critical it is to mission success. 
Therefore, in each matrix, the columns represent the level of criticality to mission 
success.  Furthermore, since each MOE measures a specific functionality of the company 
team, the criticality of the MOE is driven by how critical the matching warfighting 
function is to mission accomplishment in each scenario.  
The range of variation is a function of the data and is calculated for each MOE in 
each scenario using Equation (1.10). An MOE’s range of variation is then compared 
against the other two MOEs within each scenario to determine small, moderate, and large 
variation. Note that the numerical value for range of variation does not dictate the 
specific classification as small, moderate, or large variation. For example, the Scenario 2-
INTEL range of variation of 0.341 is assessed as moderate (see Table 21) whereas the 
Scenario 3-FER range of variation of 0.357 is assessed as large (see Table 22). Although 
similar in value, the Scenario 3-FER range of variation is significantly higher when 
compared to the other MOEs within Scenario 3, justifying the large assessment. This 
highlights the subjectivity inherent in any decision analysis in general, which is 
accounted for in the sensitivity analysis in Section E. 
 
 max value - min valuerange of variation = 
average value
  (0.10) 
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In Scenario 1, the ability to move and maneuver is most critical to success, 
followed equally by the indirect fire and intelligence warfighting functions. As such, FER 
is considered most critical while IDK and INTEL are considered moderately critical to 
mission success. Table 20 displays the range-of-variation results and criticality-to-
mission-success values for each MOE. Those values are placed in the swing weight 
matrix shown in Figure 31 and assigned non-normalized swing weight values 
accordingly. 
Table 20.   Scenario 1 Range of Variation and Level of Criticality Values 
 
 
Figure 31. Scenario 1 Swing Weight Matrix 
 
 
For Scenario 2, due to the change to an urban terrain with smaller-unit enemy 
fighters, the intelligence and movement-and-maneuver warfighting functions are the most 
critical to success.  Conversely, indirect-fire capability is of little value due to the 
MOE Criticality to MSN success
FER 0.228 moderate most critical
IDK 0.075 small moderately critical




inherent collateral-damage considerations. As a result, FER and INTEL are valued as 
most critical while IDK receives a least-critical valuation. Table 21 displays the range-of-
variation results and criticality-to-mission-success values for each MOE. Those values 
are placed in the swing weight matrix shown in Figure 32 and assigned non-normalized 
swing-weight values accordingly. 
Table 21.   Scenario 2 Range of Variation and Level of Criticality Values 
 
 
Figure 32. Scenario 2 Swing Weight Matrix 
 
 
The mission in Scenario 3 calls for the three configurations to quickly react and 
respond to an ambush through a desert-like environment. In this scenario, it is most 
critical to locate the enemy and deliver accurate artillery fire to allow the friendly forces 
to move through the kill zone expeditiously. As a result, INTEL and IDK are found to be 
most critical to mission success, while FER is moderately critical. Table 22 displays the 
MOE Criticality to MSN success
FER 0.160 moderate most critical
IDK 0.295 moderate least critical




range-of-variation results and criticality-to-mission-success values for each MOE. Those 
values are placed in the swing-weight matrix shown in Figure 33 and assigned non-
normalized swing-weight values accordingly. 
Table 22.   Scenario 3 Range of Variation and Level of Criticality Values 
 
 
Figure 33. Scenario 3 Swing Weight Matrix 
 
 
To calculate the normalized swing weights that are used to determine each 
configuration’s OR Score, Equation (1.6) is used as described earlier in Section A. To 
demonstrate, the calculation for FER in Scenario 1 is shown in Equation (1.11).  
Accordingly, the remaining normalized swing weights are displayed in Table 23. 
 
MOE Criticality to MSN success
FER 0.357 large moderately critical
IDK 0.108 moderate most critical















+ + + +
  (0.11) 
 
Table 23.   Normalized Swing Weights for each Scenario 
 1, 2, 3,
1, 2, 3,
1, 2, 3,















D. OPERATIONAL RESILIENCY DECISION BLOCK 
This research develops the Operational Resiliency Decision Block as not only a 
visual representation of the process, data, and results, but as a tool that provides a 
decision maker the opportunity to draw additional conclusions from the results. The 
block is a three-dimensional block with configurations along the length, scenarios along 
the width, and MOEs along the height. The block for this research is three-by-three-by-
three, but the design allows it to be expanded in any direction to encompass additional 
configurations, scenarios, or MOEs as the process of obtaining the OR Score remains 










Figure 34. Operational Resiliency Decision Block 
 
 
The 27 spaces in the block are filled with the 27 MOE-scenario-configuration 
weighted values calculated according to Equation (1.5). To demonstrate one of the 27 
calculations, begin with the INTEL raw value for Configuration A in Scenario 2 (
,2, 940.538A INTELx = ). Equation (1.9) is then used to normalize the raw value to a single-
dimensional value ( ,2,( ) 0.662INTEL A INTELv x = ). The normalized swing weight for INTEL in 
Scenario 2 is determined ( 2, 0.471INTELw = ) from the swing weight matrix method (from 
Table 23). These values combine so that the single-dimensional value is multiplied by the 
normalized swing weight ( 2, ,2,( ) 0.471 0.662 0.312INTEL INTEL A INTELw v x× = × = ). The 
resultant weighted value of 0.312 is the actual contribution to Configuration A’s OR 
Score ( AOR ) from the INTEL MOE in Scenario 2, and thus will be placed in the 
appropriate space in the decision block. This example is illustrated in Figure 35. 
 
 63 
Figure 35. Partial Calculation of OR Score for Configuration A 
 
 
The remaining weighted values of the OR Scores for each of the MOE-scenario-
configuration combinations are calculated accordingly and placed in the block. The next 
step in determining the OR Score is to sum weighted values across the MOEs for each 
scenario-configuration combination.  These totals are displayed in the darker blue boxes 










Figure 36. Operational Resiliency Decision Block with Scenario-
Configuration Total Scores 
 
 
Stepping through one of the calculations, the weighted-value contribution to 
Configuration A’s OR Score ( AOR ) from Scenario 1 is 0.516 ( 0.340 0.006 0.168+ + ) by 
summing across the MOEs. The last step to determine the full OR Score for 
Configuration A is to sum weighted values across the scenarios. As such, the OR Score 
for Configuration A comes out to 1.705 ( 0.516 0.451 0.738 1.705AOR = + + = ). The other 





Figure 37. OR Score for each Configuration 
 
 
Therefore, this research finds that Configuration B, with an OR Score of 2.037, is 
the most operationally resilient. Configuration C is nearly numerically equivalent to 
Configuration B with an OR Score of 2.020 while Configuration A is dominated by the 
other two with an OR Score of 1.705, making it clearly the least operationally resilient. 
Recall that operational resiliency measures the ability of a company team to preserve its 
warfighting capability when operating in different operational scenarios comprised of 
distinct mission, enemy, and terrain requirements. Note that this comprehensive look at 
the operational resiliency of each configuration produces a different conclusion than 
would be reached through examination of the scenarios in isolation. For example, 
although Configuration A is least operationally resilient, it actually performs better than 
the other two configurations in Scenario 3. The decision block affords the decision maker 
that ability to analyze performance across the scenarios. 
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The value component chart in Figure 38 shows another view of the data in the 
Operational Resiliency Decision Block that is useful to the decision maker. Each bar in 
the chart represents a particular configuration-scenario combination’s contribution to the 
OR Score from each of the MOEs. Note that all 27 values from the decision block are 
accounted for in the chart. In this view, several points are evident. FER is the most 
influential MOE in Scenario 1 while INTEL is the most influential in Scenario 2. 
Alternatively, IDK is nearly non-existent in the first two scenarios, and only becomes a 
factor in Scenario 3. This view gives decision makers and their staffs the ability to 
quickly visualize a configuration’s performance.  




E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Note that the recommendations developed in the Operational Resiliency Decision 
Block can be examined to determine the impact of the weighting scheme on the 
recommended configurations. As Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson (2011, 409) point out, 
“When dealing with complicated decisions...systems engineers must be cognizant of the 
robustness of their analysis.” Moreover, “systems engineers must conduct sensitivity 
analysis to modeling assumptions and candidate system scoring uncertainty” (410). This 
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sensitivity analysis assesses the sensitivity of the weights that are utilized in the additive 
model. The three largest assumptions made during the research manifest themselves in 
the swing weight matrices. Specifically, one assumption is made in assessing the level of 
importance (criticality) to the MOEs. A second assumption is made in assessing the 
range-of-variation valuations. Those two assumptions result in the placement of the MOE 
in the swing weight matrix and become the basis for the third assumption. The third 
assumption is made in assessing the non-normalized swing-weight value of one to 100 to 
the MOE. The goal of this sensitivity analysis is to see how adjusting the non-normalized 
swing-weight value for each MOE in each scenario affects the selection of the most 
operationally resilient configuration. 
To conduct the sensitivity analysis, each of the nine scenario-MOE non-
normalized swing weight values are varied one at a time from one to 100 at increments of 
one. While one swing-weight value varies, the other eight values are held at their original 
values in their respective swing weight matrices from Figures 31-33. As a result, the 
research finds that the most operationally-resilient configuration is sensitive to the weight 
assessment of only one of the nine scenario-MOE swing weight values—Scenario 1, 
INTEL. Figure 38 graphically shows the OR Score of each configuration as the non-















As is evident, when the non-normalized swing-weight value for Scenario 1-
INTEL MOE falls to 17 or below, Configuration C becomes the most operationally 
resilient. With an original weight of 35, the relative value of the INTEL MOE in Scenario 
1 would have to be reduced in half in order for a change in outcome to present itself. The 
remaining eight charts from the sensitivity analysis are found in Appendix C. Note that 
although Configuration C’s OR Score is nearly numerically equivalent to Configuration 
B’s OR Score, the sensitivity analysis affirms that Configuration B is the recommended 




A. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
The purpose of this project was to provide a practical example of how to assess a 
company team’s operational resiliency. The research first defined operational resiliency 
for an Army company team, and subsequently developed the MOEs with which to 
evaluate the configurations. Using MANA-V agent-based software, the research 
developed nine meta-models pitting three company team configurations against three 
distinct enemy and terrain scenarios. The research conducted a value-focused multi-
objective decision analysis of the three alternative configurations by developing MOE-
specific value functions and scenario-specific swing-weight matrices. To ensure 
robustness of the results, the research analyzed the weights for sensitivity. 
In the end, Configuration B achieved the highest OR Score of the three 
configurations analyzed. This result highlights the need to screen for operational 
resiliency in the first place. Referring to Figure 37, if these configurations were assessed 
only by their performance on Scenario 3 (Desert Ambush), Configuration A would have 
been the clear outright winner. It is only when evaluating performance across multiple 
scenarios does it become clear that Configuration A is actually the least operationally 
resilient of the three and that Configuration B is the recommended alternative. Screening 
for operationally resiliency in this manner thus provides a potentially valuable approach 
for evaluating future Army combat systems. 
The research employed MBSE in designing and analyzing the nine meta-models. 
One of the major benefits realized from MBSE was the ease with which the nine meta-
models were generated. Instead of having to start from scratch to create each model, the 
research was able to essentially insert the three alternative configurations into the three 
distinct scenarios while adjusting for maneuver tactics. Throughout the SE process, 
MBSE facilitated the inherent iterations that would have otherwise taken significantly 
longer and most likely limited the scope of the project. As a result, these nine meta-
models can be utilized for further analyses and link directly into the NPS SE 
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department’s dashboard. This project stands as a practical example in the development of 
a SoS synthesis model in concert with the application of MBSE to early life-cycle-design 
decisions. 
B. CHALLENGES 
While this study experienced few technical challenges during its course, two are 
worth further discussion.  The first relates to the inherent complexity of the agent-based 
simulation modelling software and the research groups’ unfamiliarity with it at the onset 
of the study.  The second relates to the extraction and compilation of requisite data 
produced by the simulations. 
1. MANA-V Agent Behavior 
The ABS MANA-V, which plays an integral role in the conduct of this research, 
is an intricate and complex system. The authors faced a steep learning curve in 
developing the capability to generate meta-models that accurately reflect the doctrinal 
tactics and weapons systems of an Army company team, its potential adversaries, and the 
terrain on which they operate. The research necessitated the creation and troubleshooting 
of nine distinctly-unique meta-models.  Each meta-model contained specific mission- and 
terrain-oriented interactions between friendly and enemy agents that required significant 
time resources to ensure accuracy, feasibility, and plausibility. 
2. Data Extraction and Statistical Analysis 
To gather the necessary data for the MOEs, the authors culled together data from 
four separate MANA-V output files for every run. This amounted to a total of 18,000 
data files for the 500 runs conducted on each of the nine scenario-configurations 
combinations. Commonly available software packages such as Microsoft Excel proved 
cumbersome and inefficient in aggregating that volume of data and conducting the 
subsequent statistical analysis. Therefore, this research employed such advanced software 
packages as R and JMP. Some expertise in these software packages is necessary to write 
and execute coded scripts in R that pull and combine all the MOE data from the output 
files and also in JMP to conduct statistical analysis and produce all charts and plots. 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study developed a method to determine the operational resiliency of a 
company team. Having discovered a method that is reproducible and relevant, future 
work can be performed that employs the methods used in the study and refines and 
expands the scope of this study. 
1. Altering the Unit Configurations 
The configurations used in this study were leveraged from the three highest 
ranking alternatives developed by the Vehicle Survivability Team’s project (Basala et al. 
2013). That team used a design of experiments (DOE) to create the various 
configurations they tested.  Some of these configurations created do not fall in line with 
current Army force structuring. Future work could focus on tailoring the configurations 
that represent actual or planned task organizations of combined arms teams. This analysis 
could inform maneuver commanders’ decisions regarding company-level force structures 
and training given the need to fight and win in an uncertain future. 
2. Expanding the Decision Block 
The design of the Operational Resiliency Decision Block and the analytical 
method contained therein provides the ability to seamlessly incorporate an expansion of 
the decision space. Thus, one could easily expand the decision block to include additional 
unit configurations, operational scenarios, MOEs or any combination of the three, all 
based on the needs of the decision maker. Future work could expand this study to include 
more scenarios based on potential conflict regions as well as additional company team 
configurations. This could also be used to inform future force structure requirements. 
3. Technical Injects—MUM-T 
Unmanned systems have become a permanent asset available to maneuver 
commanders in the services. The U.S. Army has integrated Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS) as a part of its maneuver elements. Those UAS assets have recently been 
integrated with Army Aviation platforms in a concept referred to as Manned Unmanned 
Teaming (MUM-T). In this concept, AH-64E aircraft are paired with UAS platforms in a 
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manner that provides the AH-64E aircrew with multiple levels of control of the UAS 
platforms including payload and sensor packages from the AH-64E (Whittle 2015). In the 
context of this research, this can be modeled by allowing for a communication link 
directly between the Apaches and the Shadows to share enemy classifications.  This 
direct communication link eliminates the Company HQ relay and provides for the 
potential for significantly reduced engagement times by the Apaches. The operational 
resiliency of each configuration can then be compared in its current state against the same 
configuration where the MUM-T concept has been implemented. 
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APPENDIX A.  WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND SENSORS 
CAPABILITIES 
In order to ensure the accuracy of the performance characteristics for both the 
friendly and enemy units, the research group derives the capabilities of both their 
weapons systems and sensors from their published capabilities. That being stated, in 
developing each of the scenarios, maximum effective ranges of weapons are tailored to fit 
the specifics of the scenario terrain and do not always match stated maximums. The 
capabilities of the sensors are determined based on the personal operational experience of 
the research group members. 
Table 24 displays the capabilities of the complement of weapons employed by 
each of the three friendly force configurations.  The table provides the caliber of each 
weapon system, both the practical and cyclical rate of fire in rounds per minute (RPM), 
what a typical combat load is in number of rounds, and the maximum effective range of 
the weapon system in meters. 
Table 24.   Friendly Forces Weapon Systems Capabilities 
 
Adapted from United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
Intelligence Support Activity, 2014. World Wide Equipment Guide. Volumes 1 and 2. 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Department of the Army. 
Table 25 presents the capabilities of the sensors for each of the element types in 
the three configurations.  Each element is provided with two different sensors, one that 
detects vehicles and another to detect dismounted infantry troops.  The table further 
displays the maximum ranges out to which each sensor can detect the specified type of 
target. 
Weapon System Caliber (mm) Rate of Fire Practical/Cyclic (RPM) Combat Load, Typical Max Effective Range (m)
M-4 5.56 16/800 210 580
M240B Med MG 7.62 750 600 1,100
7.62 (COAX) 750 800 / 3600 (stowed) 900
25 (Bushmaster) 100-200 300 / 600 (stowed) 2,000-3,000
.50cal (Heavy MG) 40/500 1,000 1,600
120 (Smooth Bore) 3/10 40 2,500
M777 Howitzer 155 2/4 64 14,600
30 (Heavy MG) 250 1,200 4,000





Table 25.   Friendly Forces Sensor Capabilities 
 
 
The capabilities for the enemy forces for each scenario are displayed in Table 26 
in the same manner as for friendly forces. 
Table 26.   Enemy Forces Weapon Systems Capabilities 
 
Adapted from United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
Intelligence Support Activity, 2014. World Wide Equipment Guide. Volumes 1 and 2. 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Department of the Army. 
 
 
Element Sensor Type Max Range (m)
Vehicle 1,500                  
Dismounted Infantry 800                    
Vehicle 1,500                  
Dismounted Infantry 1,500                  
Vehicle 3,000                  
Dismounted Infantry 1,000                  
Vehicle 3,000                  
Dismounted Infantry 1,000                  
Vehicle 1,000                  
Dismounted Infantry 1,000                  
Vehicle 8,000                  







Weapon System Caliber (mm) Rate of Fire Practical/Cyclic (RPM) Combat Load, Typical Max Effective Range (m)
AK-47 7.62 100 120 300
PKM Medium Machine Gun 7.62 250/650 1,000 1,000
NSV Heavy Maching Gun 12.7 (.57 cal) 100/800 300 800 (armor) / 2,000 (troops)
RPG-7 40 4-6 5 500
Kornet Anti-Armor Missile 2-3 4 2,500-5,500
SA-18 Igla Anti-Aircraft Missile 3-4 3 500-6,000
125 (Smooth Bore) 8 43 4,000
7.62 (COAX) 250 1250 1,000
12.7 (.57cal) 100 500 800 (armor) / 2,000 (troops)
IED Mine N/A 1 35
Anti-Tank Mine Mine N/A 1 75
120mm Mortar 120 10/18 70 7,200
T-90 Main Battle Tank
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Table 27 displays the capabilities for the sensors of each of the enemy force 
element types in the much the same manner as friendly forces. 
 
Table 27.   Enemy Forces Sensors Capabilities 
 
 
Element Sensor Type Max Range (m)
Vehicle 1,500                  
Dismounted Infantry 800                    
Vehicle 1,500                  
Dismounted Infantry 800                    
Vehicle 1,500                  
Dismounted Infantry 800                    
Vehicle 2,500                  
Dismounted Infantry -                     
Vehicle 1,500                  
Dismounted Infantry -                     
Vehicle 1,500                  
Dismounted Infantry 800                    
Vehicle 3,000                  
Dismounted Infantry 1,000                  
Vehicle 1,500                  
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APPENDIX B.  SCENARIO TERRAINS 
The specifics for how the terrain is modeled for each scenario are presented in this 
appendix. In MANA-V, terrain is developed by providing each different terrain type a 
numerical value in three categories—going, cover, and concealment. The values range 
from zero to one, with zero representing the least effect and one the most. Going relates 
to movement restrictions, therefore a terrain type with a going value of one presents 
unrestricted movement. Cover equates to the ability of a terrain feature to protect an 
agent from weapons effects. A terrain feature with a value of one means would provide 
maximum cover to agents. Concealment is the ability to prevent an agent from being 
‘seen,’ or in the case of the model being detected and classified. The higher the value the 
more concealment the terrain feature provides. 
The specific values associated with the various terrain features for Scenario 1 is 
displayed in Table 28. The terrain for this scenario reaches a maximum elevation of 2,150 
meters and has a minimum of 1,760 meters. 
Table 28.   Scenario 1 Terrain Features 
 
 























The specific values associated with the various terrain features for Scenario 2 is 
displayed in Table 29. The terrain for this scenario reaches a maximum elevation of 15 
meters and has a minimum of zero meters. 
Table 29.   Scenario 2 Terrain Features 
 
 
The specific values associated with the various terrain features for Scenario 3 is 
displayed in Table 30. The terrain for this scenario reaches a maximum elevation of 155 






























Table 30.   Scenario 3 Terrain Features 
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APPENDIX C.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS CURVES 
The remaining eight sensitivity charts show the OR Scores for each configuration 
as each respective scenario-MOE non-normalized swing-weight value is varied from one 
to 100. The charts can be seen in Figures 40–46 with their initial (or original) weight 
noted by the dashed line. 
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